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2 
Executive Summary 
 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 is one of the largest 
government responses to an economic crisis in the history of the United States.  The 
purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of the total funds awarded to 
states by federal agencies in the Recovery Act.  A review of budgetary theory, 
distributive politics, and electoral vote maximization theory provides context of 
historical determinants of resource allocation by the federal government.   
Then from this literature I develop a model including economic and political 
variables.  The dependent variable in my model is the total funds awarded to the 
fifty states expressed per capita for thirty-four federal agencies between February 
17, 2009 and December 31, 2011.  I organize the data into a panel for 1700 
observations and use regression with agency fixed-effects to control for the average 
differences across agencies in observable and unobservable ways.  I also cluster by 
state because the variances vary systematically based on unobserved, correlated 
state characteristics.  
The analysis provides strong evidence that four of my chosen independent 
variables affected the funds awarded in the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act.  Economically, the total revenue growth of a state between 2007 and 2008 and 
the amount of federal aid received per capita have positive and statistically 
significant relationships with the amount of funds awarded.   Politically, the 
presidential election competitiveness of states and the number of Representatives 
serving on the House Full Committee on Appropriations have negative and 
statistically significant relationships with the dependent variable.  The results 
suggest that the awarding of funds in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
are consistent with the literature indicating that a combination of politics and 
economics matter in allocating scarce resources among alternative uses.  
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I.  Background 
 
 The economic recession that originated in the United States in 2007 and 
quickly spread across the globe is now referred to as the ‘Great Recession’.  The 
unprecedented downturn and financial crisis prompted the United States 
government to act to unblock the credit markets, provide banks with more capital, 
and reduce the effects of the recession on its citizens.1   These actions were formally 
adopted through the enactment of 1) the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, 2) the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, and finally 3) the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  
The magnitude of the legislation was almost as unprecedented as the 
magnitude of the recession that preceded.  The Congressional Budget Office 
estimates the total cost of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 as $124 billion2, $700 billion3, and $787 billion4 respectively for a total 
price tag of $1.6 trillion.  Therefore, the size and significance of these laws calls for 
close examination of their implementation and effectiveness.  The purpose of this 
paper is to examine the determinants of the total funds awarded to the states 
through the final—and perhaps most controversial—of the three pieces of 
legislation, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
 
 
                                                        
1 Saving the system. Economist. pp.15-16. 
2 CBOa report. H.R. 5140 The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. p.1  
3 CBOb report. H.R. 1424 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. p.3 
4 CBOc report. H.R. 1 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. p.1 
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The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
President Barack Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA, Recovery Act, or Stimulus) into law on February 17, 2009, just five 
weeks after he took the oath of office.  It was the largest government response to an 
economic crisis in the history of the United States and quickly captured the attention 
of the American public because of its size, promise of improvement, and 
exacerbation of partisan politics.5 
Although the legislation drew criticism, many Americans agreed the 
economy, the states, and the people needed help.  In 2009, the economy was so bad 
that 43 states faced budget gaps totaling more than $60 billion.6  The second quarter 
of 2009 represented the worst year to year decline in total tax revenue for the 
combined fifty states in the last 50 years at 16 percent.7  Given these daunting digits, 
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman went so far as to say the bill was inadequate and that 
the Administration did not ask for enough money.8 
Using $787 billion, the Recovery Act had three main goals: to create and save 
jobs, to spur economy activity and invest in long-term growth, and to foster 
unprecedented levels of accountability and transparency in Recovery spending.9  
These goals have been pursued through $288 billion in tax cuts and benefits, $224 
billion of funding for entitlement programs, and $275 billion in contract, grant, and 
loan awards.10 
                                                        
5 Whatley, C.  p.1 
6 Chodrow et al. ““Does State Fiscal Relief During Recessions Increase Employment? Evidence from the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act”  p.20 
7 Bradbury, K. “State Government Budgets and the Recovery Act” p.29 
8 Krugman (Op-Ed)  
9 Goals of the Recovery Act, http://www.recovery.gov/About/GetStarted/Pages/WhatisRecoveryAct.aspx . 
10 Ibid. 
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The allocation of funds for tax cuts and benefits and entitlement programs 
was largely based on predetermined formulas.  According to Whatley (2010), sixty 
percent of the Recovery Act will go through state governments, which includes $140 
billion in budget relief, $100 billion in formula allocation, education funds, social 
safety net spending and infrastructure funds, and more than $60 billion in 
competitive grant opportunities.11  Therefore, a majority of the Stimulus can be 
explained using formulas for budget relief, Medicaid, education funds, and other 
social programs.   
My research focuses on the $275 billion that was awarded to the fifty states 
through contracts, grants, and loans because these funds were not prearranged, 
which provides an opportunity to analyze the awarding determinants.  To be clear, 
the three types of awards are defined in ARRA as follows; a grant is “an award of 
financial assistance from a federal agency to a recipient to carry out a public project 
or service authorized by a law of the United States,” a contract is “an agreement 
between a company and the Federal government for the provision of products or 
services,” and a loan is “a temporary provision of funds from a federal agency to a 
recipient.”12 
Before analyzing the awards, it is important to understand how these funds 
are transferred to the states.  First, Congress appropriates the stimulus funds to 
federal agencies.  Then the federal agencies either make the funds available to state 
and local governments or send them directly to academia, businesses, or 
                                                        
11 Whatley,C. p. 386. 
12 ARRA Glossary. http://www.recovery.gov/FAQ/Pages/glossaryHome.aspx#ghi  
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organizations.13  Within the states, state agencies then select projects for the 
funding.  In my analysis, I am only concerned with what determined the initial 
amount awarded to the states by the federal agencies, measured as the sum of funds 
awarded by a federal agency to a prime recipient in that state.14  I do not to look at 
the types of projects thereafter or even the final amount allocated because this is 
either a function of state policy or bidding processes which I am not inquiring about.  
Since the enactment of ARRA, several analyses have been completed 
examining national and county level fund distributions.  I aim to perform a more 
targeted analysis of the determinants of ARRA funding by including up-to-date data 
for funds awarded by agency to see if the results differ from prior findings. 
 The paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews literature on budgetary 
theory, congressional dominance theory, electoral vote maximization theory and 
looks at applied empirical analyses of federal fund allocation.  Section III presents 
the research design used for my analysis.  Section IV provides the results of the 
analysis and Section V draws conclusions, concedes the caveats and limitations, and 
suggests opportunities for future research.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 How the Money Moves Overview. http://www.recovery.gov/About/RecoveryInAction/Pages/HowMoneyMoves.aspx  
14 ARRA Glossary.  
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II. Literature Review 
Given the amount of scholarship on budgeting theory and distributive 
politics, I cannot do justice here to the entire literature.  Therefore, I limit this 
review to studies that summarize the basic concepts most relevant to studying the 
determinants of fund allocation by the federal government. 
 
Summary of Budgetary Theory 
V.O. Key (1940) writes the basic budgeting problem; “On what basis shall it 
be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?”  This means that 
budget makers must decide how to allocate scarce means among alternative uses 
because they will never have enough revenue to meet everyone’s requests.  Since 
1940 many competing theories in political, economic, and financial literature have 
attempted to answer his question.  In fact, my research question can be restated as, 
“On what basis was it decided to award ARRA contract, grant, and loan dollars to 
state A instead of state B?” 
Aaron Wildavksy’s answer to Key’s question is that funds are allocated as 
increases or decreases from last year’s allocation because of the political process.  
Jones and McCaffery (1994) summarize the work of Wildavsky, who developed the 
concept known as incrementalism which means budget makers rarely start a budget 
completely from scratch.  Instead, they look at last year’s budget and then focus on 
small ranges of increases or decreases.  From an agency perspective, Wildavsky 
(1966) says these ranges are small because if agencies ask for too much money 
compared to last year it may harm their credibility, and if they ask for too little they 
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will not receive adequate funds.  From the legislative perspective, he says budgeting 
is incremental because Congress works under time constraints and has limited 
knowledge of agency operations.  I imagine that Wildavsky would begin an analysis 
of ARRA fund determinants by examining last year’s allocation of federal contracts, 
grants, and loans to the states. 
 
Congressional Dominance Theory 
Including politics in decisions regarding the distribution of government 
resources is known as distributive politics.  Hamman (1997) defines distributive 
politics as administrators deciding “who will be assisted, when they will be assisted, 
and how much assistance they will receive from distributive types of programs,” 
(Hamman 56).  This administrative power of Congress and the Executive underlies 
the discussion of the congressional dominance and electoral vote maximization 
theories, two possible explanations of ARRA award distributions.   
The congressional dominance theory describes Congress’s dominant 
relationship with the bureaucracy and defines decision-making in Congress as self-
interested and specialized.  According to Weingast (1984) and Moe (1987) the 
congressional dominance theory is that Congress controls the bureaucracy.  This 
control comes from several sources.  First, Weingast (1984) says that agencies 
depend on Congress because Congress has the power to create new agencies and 
appropriate funds.  The theory also reflects politicians’ desires to be reelected.  
Weingast elaborates that in order to increase their chances of reelection, politicians 
gain influence over a set of issues that are relevant to their constituency.  The best 
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way to increase this chance is through committee assignments in the relevant policy 
areas.  In turn, the committees enjoy oversight over specific agencies.  Moe (1987) 
points out that these committees have jurisdiction over agency budgets and enjoy 
close relationships with agency personnel.  Fiorina (1977) says this causes 
‘symbiotic (or interdependent) relationships’ to develop between federal agencies 
and congressional committees and subcommittees because the bureaucrats 
acknowledge that their success depends upon satisfying congressional interests, so 
they provide benefits to Congress. 
The theory has been elaborated to say that Congress also dominates because 
of institutionalized exchanges of influence and agenda management.  Weingast 
(1988) argues that the committee system has institutionalized exchanges of 
influence so that members do not need to trade votes per se.  Holcombe (1991) 
contends that the institutionalization is effective.  He says the committees and the 
seniority system of assignments subdivide property rights causing the agenda to be 
better managed.  While effective, the committee system intensifies electoral 
incentives, because the theory is still based on the legislators’ motivation to be 
reelected.   
Finally, public discourse often uses partisan politics in Congress to explain 
the distribution of funds because the party that holds the majority in Congress 
controls the power of the purse.  However, this is not always the case.  To see if this 
was true, Balla (2002) analyzed the politics of appropriations earmarks to 
institutions of higher education between 1995 and 2000.  He claimed there is a 
collective action problem in appropriating funds because members of the majority 
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and minority parties would like to secure money for their constituencies but would 
like to avoid being blamed for wastefulness.  Balla confirmed his claim and found 
that the majority party gave the minority party some money; this finding supports 
his blame avoidance explanation.  Another factor that mitigates partisan politics is 
spillover effects between congressional districts.  Levitt and Snyder (1997) point 
out that because the benefits of grants are not restricted within district lines, state 
delegations or members from the same region work together, across party lines, to 
advocate for grant awards.  Therefore, spillover effects and blame avoidance leave 
party politics as a poor explanation for why funds are awarded by Congress.  In sum, 
the congressional dominance theory contends that the incentive to be reelected, the 
exchange of influence, agenda management, and the symbiotic relationship with 
agencies cause Congress to control federal agencies and ultimately resource 
distribution. 
 
Electoral Vote Maximization Theory 
In contrast to the theory that Congress has influence over the allocation of 
government expenditures and the bureaucracy, the electoral vote maximization 
theory assigns significant influence to the president and the executive branch.  
Wright (1974) and Bertelli and Grose (2009) agree that the president influences 
allocations.  Wright argues that “interstate inequalities in per capita federal 
spending can be explained in large part as a result of a process of (the president) 
maximizing expected electoral votes,” (Wright 30).  To test the theory, Wright 
examined the allocation of jobs by state by the Works Progress Administration in 
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the New Deal.  His analysis included variables reflecting economic distress (fall in 
income, per capita relief, and unemployment) as well as political factors (electoral 
votes per capita, standard deviation of Democratic share, and an index of political 
productivity) of 48 states.  He found that jobs were allocated as a result of the 
interaction between political and economic forces because political productivity, the 
standard deviation of Democratic share, unemployment rate, and relief cases shared 
statistically significant relationships with work-relief jobs in either the 1936 or the 
1940 model.  
Similarly, Bertelli and Grose (2009) find that the president plays an 
important role.  One of three hypotheses tested in the study was “as the electoral 
competitiveness of a state in the presidential election increases (decreases), the 
amount of grant dollars allocated to that state likewise increases (decreases).  If 
grants are allocated to safe constituencies, this relationship will be reversed,” 
(Bertelli 932).  Bertelli and Grose use Department of Labor (DOL) discretionary 
grant outlays and Department of Defense (DOD) procurement contracts from 1992-
2002 as dependent variables in two models to determine what influenced the 
allocation to states.  The results found that the presidential election competitiveness 
of a state (measured by the number of electoral votes in that state divided by the 
absolute margin between the two major party presidential candidates in the 
previous election) shared a negative and statistically significant relationship with 
grant outlays from the DOL.  The negative relationship signifies that the DOL grants 
rewarded the president’s supporters and not competitive electoral states.  However, 
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the same was not true for DOD contracts so generalizability across all federal 
agencies was not achieved in the study.  
In contrast, Hamman (1997) assessed the processing time for Urban Mass 
Transit Administration discretionary capital assistance grants during the Nixon-
Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations to analyze whether presidents influence 
bureaucrats to distribute funds to enhance their reelection chances.  They analyzed 
political variables (election year, presidential support, grant size, and congressional 
committee membership and seniority,) and found Congress and bureaucrats better 
explain distributive politics.  They concluded by saying that while presidents do not 
explain the amount of allocations, they may influence bureaucrats with regard to the 
timing of assistance grants. 
 
Applied Analyses 
Finally, three studies on stimulus fund allocation, one from the New Deal and 
two from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, are relevant to my 
research.  First, Anderson (1991) applied the aforementioned theories to examine 
what determined the allocation of resources in the New Deal.  Anderson analyzed 
the determinants of the $27.4 billion dollars of federal spending in the New Deal 
between 1933 and 1939, which were largely supposed to be allocated according to 
economic need.  Unlike other studies, he controlled for the number of highway 
miles, the amount of federal land, and the farm value of the states in addition to the 
usual unemployment, state income, committee assignments, and congressional 
tenure variables to test his hypotheses.  The results of six models found that political 
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factors played a role.  In particular, the tenure of the senators and representatives 
on the appropriations committee and the electoral votes per capita in the states 
were important.  Also, the economic situation in the states had a weak relationship 
with the New Deal program allocations.  Anderson’s analysis suggests that New Deal 
spending was partially motivated by need and partly by political influence.  
 More recently, Gimpel et al. (2010) reviewed similar literature to examine 
the geographic distribution of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
spending.  The analysis was done at the county level across all fifty states and tested 
two explanations of why the government fails to distribute resources according to 
need.  First, they believe that political and institutional factors such as legislative 
leadership, presidential influence, and majority parties can explain why funds are 
allocated.  Second, Gimpel cites John Kingdon’s policy process theory that problems, 
policy solutions, and politics come together—at times haphazardly—to form policy 
when windows of opportunity present themselves to policymakers.  They claim that 
legislators used the economic crisis as a policy window and took the opportunity to 
seek funding for their constituencies.  They found that funds were poorly targeted to 
economic need.  There is potential bias in their analysis because 1) they left out the 
state capital counties and 2) they fail to distinguish if the allocations to counties 
were distributed at the federal or state level.  This distinction is important because 
it could be that state governments failed to distribute funds by need, not the Federal 
government. 
Young and Sobel (2010) examine what factors affect the ARRA allocations at 
the state level for both agency-reported data (funds announced, funds made 
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available, funds paid out) and recipient-reported data (funds awarded and funds 
received) between February 2009 and April 2010.  They accounted for 
demographic, economic, and political variables but with 17 predictors and only 50 
observations they ran separate models based on these categories.  In the main 
regression that incorporated variables from each, Young and Sobel found 
population, federal aid from 2008, the average tenure of members serving in the 
House of Representatives and Senate, and whether Obama won in 2008 to be 
statistically significant.  However, only population was statistically significant across 
all five types of fund measures and the Senate tenure had a negative effect.  In all, 
they conclude that it was a poorly designed countercyclical policy because the gross 
domestic product and unemployment variables were not significant.  However, this 
analysis can be improved upon because only a portion of the funds were awarded at 
the time it was written and the significance of the variables vary among the five 
types of allocations, so the results lack explanatory power. 
In sum, the literature shows that federal fund allocation determinants vary 
across time just as stakeholders, public opinion, and economic conditions change 
over time.  The literature and previous models direct my statistical inquiry on the 
determinants of the funds awarded by agency for the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act.   
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IV. Research Design 
My null hypothesis (H0) is that unemployment, income, tax effort, and 
congressional and presidential political variables have no effect on ARRA funds 
awarded by agency per capita.  Funds are defined per capita because a neutral 
allocation would not be equal across states, rather it would be equal across people.  
The alternative hypothesis (H1) is that these variables have an effect on how ARRA 
funds were awarded by agency per capita.   The federal source agencies of the 
awards to the fifty states serve as the primary units of analysis in my model.  Prior 
to my analysis, I expected to reject the null hypothesis, as the literature suggests 
that federal fund allocation is not only determined by need because other political 
and economic differences matter. 
 
Data Collection 
The total funds awarded by agency per capita at the state level will serve as 
the dependent variable in my model because it is the outcome of interest.  I collected 
these data from recovery.gov in cumulative amounts by state between February 17, 
2009 and December 31, 2011 and disaggregated them by agency.  When I accessed 
the data, they were current as of February 29, 2012.  Recovery information is 
reported in agency and recipient formats and I use recipient reported data because 
it includes the dollar amounts collected from recipients of federal contract, grant, 
and loan awards.  The agency reported data includes the entitlements and tax 
benefits, which are not the focus of my research.  The data were collected and 
organized into a panel dataset with an observation being a state and an agency.  
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Thirty-four federal agencies allocated money to the states in ARRA; therefore my 
sample size has 1700 observations (50 states by 34 agencies).  
My model also controls for a common series of economic and political 
variables.  The majority of this model replicates the design that Dr. Andrew T. Young 
used in his 2010 paper “Recovery and Reinvestment Act Spending at the State Level: 
Keynesian Stimulus or Distributive Politics?”15  However, my model disaggregates 
the total funds to analyze total funds by agency and instead of including population 
as an independent variable, I account for it by using funds per capita.  I do this 
because larger states clearly received more money, but the question is whether they 
received more per person. 
First, the January 2009 seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, determined 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/,16 is included in the model to 
determine if the level of unemployment affected the amount of awards a state 
received.  I predict the unemployment rate will share a positive relationship with 
funds awarded because the goal of the Stimulus was to reduce the effects of the 
recession on the population.  Then, the state tax revenue growth as a percentage 
increase or decrease between FY2007 and FY2008 cited from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s 2007 and 2008 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections is 
included to account for the condition of tax revenue in the states.  I expect this will 
share a negative relationship with funds awarded because higher revenue growth 
                                                        
15 Dr. Andrew Young of the University of West Virginia was kind enough to share his dataset ‘Public Choice’ used for his 2010 
publication “Recovery and Reinvestment Act Spending at the State Level: Keynesian Stimulus or Distributive Politics?” for use on my 
Capstone.  All sources listed are where they originally came from. 
16 See Appendix A for BLS definitions of seasonally adjusted unemployment rate.  
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may indicate that the state was less affected by the recession, had strong tax 
collection efforts, or maintained a strong tax base.  
Then, the per capita gross domestic product for 2008 measured in real 
dollars—which adjusts for inflation based on national prices for goods and services 
within each state—is included in the model.  The average change in state gross 
domestic product between 2006 and 2008, measured as a percent increase or 
decrease is also included.  Data were collected using the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis Gross Domestic Product by State Interactive Map application.17   
Finally, the total amount of grants and payments that the states received 
from the federal government in 2008 is also controlled for because incremental 
budgeting theory suggests that aid received last year affects how much is allocated 
this year.  It also gives a better indication of the relationship between the severity of 
the earlier part of the recession and the relief the states received prior to ARRA.  
This measure can also be interpreted as the state’s previous ability to capture 
federal aid, so including it in the model is important.  The measure was provided by 
the Census Bureau.  
The economic variables must be controlled for in the model because they 
may explain the amount of funds awarded by agency.  If the Stimulus was based on 
need, states experiencing slower growth would receive more funds. 
Then, congressional and presidential variables are included in the model to 
test the theories of congressional dominance and electoral vote maximization.  To 
control for the effect of seniority and experience, the average tenure by state of 
                                                        
17 Gross Domestic Product by State (GDP by State) Interactive Map. http://www.bea.gov/regional/gdpmap/.  
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members of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate serving in the 111th 
Congress is included from the data provided by Young (2010).  Level of tenure can 
correlate with important committee assignments and lack of party competition in 
the home district or state.  Hence, I predict that a state with a higher average tenure 
would be better off competing for funds in ARRA.  Then, variables for the number of 
Representatives and Senators who serve on the appropriations committees by state 
was accessed from www.nationaljournal.com and included in the model.  The 
congressional dominance theory suggests that membership on an appropriations 
committee influences the allocation of federal outlays so I predict these will have 
positive relationships with the amount of funds awarded.  Initial testing of the 
appropriations subcommittee memberships found no relationship with the 
dependent variable and collinearity with other political and economic factors and 
therefore they were not included in the final model. 
Political variables associated with the president are included because 
according to the electoral vote maximization theory and Young (2010), a president 
may allocate resources to either reward states for their support in past elections or 
to influence them for future elections.  A dummy variable is included for whether 
President Obama won the state in the 2008 presidential election.  Then, I used a 
measure called the ‘presidential election competitiveness’ using Bertelli’s (2009) 
formula.  The measure is the number of electoral votes in the state divided by the 
absolute margin—measured as a percentage—between the two major party 
candidates in the 2008 presidential election (Obama and McCain).  Large values 
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indicate significant battleground states and smaller values indicate uncompetitive 
states or states with few electoral votes.   
For example, Missouri has 11 electoral votes, and Obama won 49.3% of the 
popular vote while McCain won 49.4%, allowing for a very small margin and a total 
PEC equal to 8725.  Then, California has 55 electoral votes, but Obama won 61% of 
the popular vote and McCain won 37%.  Therefore, the PEC for California is 228, 
much smaller than Missouri’s, even though there are a lot more electoral votes at 
stake there.  According to Bertelli, this effect should be positive if grants are 
allocated to important, electoral battleground states (like Missouri), but negative if 
the President’s electoral goals are met by rewarding states having offered strong 
previous support (like California).  I expect the administration used spending to 
reward the states that voted for Obama in 2008 and were strongly supportive, like 
California.  Hence, I anticipate a positive and negative relationship for these 
presidential predictors respectively.  The presidential election information was 
provided by the Federal Election Commission at www.fec.gov.  
I believe that these variables are all reliable measures (not subject to any 
significant measurement error) of the phenomena I wish to control for in the model 
because they are not based on random components and they come from 
government sources.  All definitions and links to data sources can be found in the 
References section. 
 Table 1 provides the descriptions of all the variables included in the final 
model with their abbreviations, descriptions, expected signs, and sources. 
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Model 
Instead of using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models for each of 
the thirty-four agencies to observe the effects, I created a panel dataset.  Panel data 
observe the dependent variables across time for a set of units, here states, more 
than once.  In my case, the states are observed repeatedly for various federal 
agencies.  The sample size of my analysis is the number of agencies, 34, times the 
number of states, 50, so the total number of observations is 1700.  The dependent 
variable, y, is now funds awarded by a particular agency in a particular state, 
expressed per capita. 
Organizing the data as a panel allowed me to use a fixed-effects regression 
model, which holds constant (or fixes) the average effects for each agency.  By doing 
this, I controlled for the average differences across agencies in observable and 
unobservable ways, most importantly the large size differences, therefore leaving 
behind the within-agency differences.  This helps to reduce the threat of omitted 
variable bias and prevent large agencies from dominating the estimation.  So, if the 
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funds awarded were equal across all states then the dependent variable would not 
vary across states but it would across agencies because they vary in size.   
 
The model is specified as: 
Yia = 0 + 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3 + 4X4 + 5X5 + 6X6 + 7X7 + 8X8 + 9X9 + 10X10 + 11X11 + αa +  
Where Yia denotes the funds awarded to a particular state i for agency a,  X1 – X11 represent the eleven 
independent variables, α is the fixed effect of the agency, representing size, purpose, and other fixed 
characteristics, and  denotes the random error in the model.  Table 2 provides the summary 
statistics for all of the independent variables in the model. 
Table 2.  Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable       Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Total funds awarded by agency 
per capita (dollars per capita) 50 $21.37 $26.26 $0.00 $126.74
January 2009 Seasonally Adjusted 
Unemployment Rate (percentage) 50 7.16% 1.80% 3.70% 11.60%
Tax revenue growth from 2007 to 
2008 (percentage) 50 4.31% 9.10% -6.80% 59.13%
Real per capita gross domestic 
product in 2008 (dollars per 
capita) 50  $  36,408.00  $  6,520.95  $  24,403.65  $  56,401.84 
Average GDP growth in the states 
between 2006 to 2008 
(percentage) 50 0.70% 1.59% -2.27% 6.77%
Per capita federal aid to state and 
local governments in 2008 
(dollars per capita) 50  $            1.69  $          0.65  $            0.99  $            4.38 
Average House tenure (years) 50 8.00 5.71 0 36.00
Average Senate tenure (years) 50 12.09 8.61 0 37.00
Number of Senators on the Full 
Committee on Appropriations 50 0.5800 0.4985 0 1
Number of Representatives on the 
Full Committee on Appropriations 50 1.3200 1.5964 0 7
Presidential election 
competitiveness 50 348.46 1286.96 8.84 8725.00
Voted for Obama in 2008 (dummy 
variable either 0 or 1) 50 0.5800 0.4985 0 1 
Obs= Number of Observations
St. Dev= Standard Deviation
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IV. Results 
Based on the results presented in Table 3, the model shows that four 
variables have a significant influence on the funds awarded by agency per capita.  
First, if the awards are equal per person across all states, ‘y’ would not vary across 
states.  But it would vary across agencies, because they vary in size from small to 
large.  In my analysis, I find that the allocation is not equal across states.   
Table 3. Results 
 
 First, the state tax revenue growth as a percentage increase or decrease 
between FY2007 and FY2008 shares a positive and statistically significant 
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relationship with agency funds awarded at the 0.01 level.   For every one percent 
increase in state tax revenue growth between 2007 and 2008, the total funds 
awarded by agency per capita increased by $0.76.  I expected the relationship to be 
negative, or at least statistically insignificant, and this is not the case.  The results 
indicate that states that were in better conditions as far as tax collection efforts 
received more money from ARRA than states that experienced poor tax collection 
efforts.   
Next, the total amount of grants and payments that the states received from 
the federal government in 2008 also shares a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with stimulus funds at the 0.01 level.  The results show that for every 
one dollar increase in federal aid per capita in 2008, funds awarded by agency per 
capita increased by $5.60.  This was not surprising as I expected that states who had 
previously received substantial federal aid, due to need or from previous political 
extraction ability, would also receive awards in ARRA.  
The results also indicate that the number of representatives on the House full 
committee on appropriations shares a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with the total funds awarded by agency per capita at the 0.01 level.  For 
every one member increase in the number of representatives on the committee, 
funds awarded by agency per capita decreased by $2.13.  This is opposite of the 
congressional dominance theory prediction, that appropriations committee 
assignments help politicians distribute resources to their constituencies. 
 Finally, the presidential election competitiveness shares a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with the total funds awarded by agency per 
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capita.  The standard deviation for this measure (1286), multiplied by the coefficient 
(-0.000741), indicates that for every one standard deviation change in the PEC, 
funds awarded by agency per capita decreases by $0.95.  This measure is significant 
at the 0.01 level.  I expected this variable to share a negative relationship because 
Bertelli says a negative relationship means that the president’s electoral goals were 
met by rewarding the states that had the least pay off electorally, previously offered 
strong support, or were small states.  It is logical that he rewarded recent 
supporters because the ARRA fund awards were given just months after the election 
and years away from the next presidential election. 
 Some of the variables that I expected to have a significant influence on the 
funds awarded did not.   For example, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate 
and the real per capita gross domestic product were insignificant in determining 
where the money was awarded.  The major goals of the ARRA were to create and 
save jobs and spur economic activity, so I expected funds to be targeted towards the 
hardest hit states, and this is not what the results show.  Also, the average tenure of 
the Representatives and Senators in states were insignificant which I thought would 
have a significant impact on where money was awarded because I thought seniority 
would enhance a state’s ability to compete for funds.  
 
Discussion 
To answer my question, if politics or economics mattered in determining 
ARRA awards, I must consider the substance of the results. But this is a matter of 
interpretation because the significance of the coefficients has different meanings to 
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different audiences. For example, a predicted $2.13 decrease in awards by agency 
per capita given one more representative on the appropriations committee by state 
may appear to be insignificant. But if the state has a population of 5 million people, 
this translates into $10.65 million less than a state with one less representative and 
the same population.  To me, these results are substantively insignificant and 
counterintuitive because congressional dominance theory suggests that 
representatives request appropriations committee assignments due to the power of 
the purse.  Yet, I can also interpret this result as possible validation of the blame 
avoidance theory.  In this light, representatives on the appropriations committee 
might have (although unlikely) diverted funds from their districts to avoid 
accusations that they allocated funds unfairly. 
Overall, the political variables of whether Obama won in 2008 and the tenure 
in the House and Senate did not matter.  What did matter was the representation on 
the House appropriations committee, but it had a negative effect on funds awarded 
as mentioned.  The negative relationship between funds and competitiveness of the 
state has several interpretations so the substantive significance is harder to 
determine.  It can be interpreted that Obama’s electoral goals were met as a result of 
1) rewarding states that strongly supported him in 2008, 2) rewarding small states, 
or 3) rewarding states with the least pay off electorally.  No matter the explanation, 
a decrease of $0.95 per capita lacks substance when you compare it to the billions 
awarded in the Stimulus. 
Economically, the gross domestic product measures for states and 
individuals and unemployment rates were not statistically significant so ARRA 
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awards do not seem to have been a response to need.  The tax revenue growth result 
can be interpreted in this way.  
To illustrate, for every one percent increase in a state’s tax revenue growth 
between 2007 and 2008, the total funds awarded by agency per capita increased by 
$0.76.  Using a similar metric, if a state with a population of 5 million people grew its 
tax revenues by one percent between 2007 and 2008, it received $3.83 million more 
than a state with one less percent growth in revenue with the same population.  This 
indicates that the rich states, relative in terms of marginal tax revenue growth in 
that year, got richer.  This may be a result of 1) a state’s strong ability to collect taxes 
from their constituency, 2) a state’s relative tax base growth, or 3) a state’s capacity 
to absorb or collect federal grants, loans, and contracts and carry out projects.  The 
results do not distinguish between these explanations, but regardless, the Stimulus 
rewarded states for their tax effort. 
Because of the variation of explanations, some may argue that the economic 
measures included do not correlate with a state’s capacity to save or create jobs and 
to spur economic activity.  Given that these were the goals of the Recovery Act, the 
states that were worse off may not have been the policymakers’ perceived best 
place to award scarce funds.  Nonetheless, the economic variables that did matter 
were the federal aid per capita and tax revenue growth.  The federal aid per capita is 
consistent with Wildavsky’s theory of incrementalism because agency awards are 
partly explained by last year’s allocation.  While $5.56 more per capita is the largest 
magnitude among the statistically significant variables, it is also not a controversial 
finding and was expected. 
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In sum, four economic and political variables are statistically significant in 
the model but they lack substantive significance in dollar terms.  The majority of the 
variation in funds awarded is explained by agencies.  The fixed-effects analysis gave 
a rho value of 0.749, indicating that 74.9% of the variance is due to, or explained by, 
the differences across agencies.  This is not surprising, as agencies vary in size.  
Therefore, economics and politics did not matter in practical terms but should not 
be discounted given the strength of the analysis.  Regardless of interpretation, I 
hope that the findings have added to the literature on the legislation and encourage 
future research. 
 
Defense of Results 
The empirical results have descriptive power because the methodology I use 
preserves internal validity so I am confident that I have uncovered causal effects of 
the variables.  The F value is <0.001, which shows that some of the coefficients in the 
model are statistically significantly different from zero and things unique to each 
agency are quite important. 
My results are generalizable within the United States because I included all 
fifty states and their characteristics in my analysis.  However, the results are not 
generalizable to other times and settings because the stakeholders involved in 
policymaking are always changing and this analysis only regards the ARRA as of 
February 29, 2012.  
The fixed-effects model yields lower standard errors than would otherwise 
be observed in ordinary least squares because it is only using the within-agency 
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variation.  In my model I clustered by state.  This corrects for the shared variance 
arising from repeated observation of states, i.e. non-independent observations.   
The fixed-effects of the agencies allow for interpretation that the remaining 
coefficients and p-values have descriptive power. The methodology and 
characteristics of the model allow me to say with confidence that it is unlikely that I 
got these p-values and t-statistics with the means, null effects, and standard errors 
in a world where the null hypothesis is true.  Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis 
that unemployment, income, tax effort, and congressional and presidential political 
variables have no effect on ARRA funds awarded by agency per capita.  The complete 
regression results with agency descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
The results of my analysis show that state tax revenue growth between 2007 
and 2008, federal aid per capita in 2008, number of representatives on the full 
Committee on Appropriations, and the presidential election competitiveness predict 
the total funds awarded to states by agency per capita in the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009.  However, these findings lack substantive significance in 
dollar terms and the majority of the variation in awards is explained by differences 
in agencies.   
 
Caveats and Limitations  
Like any analysis, there are limitations and caveats.  A limitation of my 
analysis is the selection of measures and variables included in my model.  I collected 
data on levels and year to year changes for most of the economic variables and ran 
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correlation tests on them.   The correlation tests measured the strength and 
direction of the linear relationships between variables.  For example, the correlation 
between the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in 2009 and the change in 
unemployment rates between 2008 and 2009 was 0.8895.  Based on this high 
correlation, I only included the seasonally adjusted measure in the final model.  
Different combinations of measures on unemployment, income, and tax revenue 
growth might produce different results. 
There are likely other variables that were not included in the model that 
could explain the total awards by agency, namely agency characteristics and the job 
creation ability of states.  I did not include agency characteristics as predictors 
because the congressional dominance theory says Congress controls agencies, 
therefore I only included Congressional predictors.  I also controlled for observable 
and unobservable agency characteristics using the fixed effects model but this does 
not account for all agency factors.  Then, an ideal variable to include in my model 
would be a measure of a state’s capacity to save or create jobs and to spur economic 
activity.  Such measures do not exist at a state aggregated level.  If they did, they may 
explain if the distribution of funds was based on the stated goals of the Act better 
than the other economic independent variables. 
Finally, a dataset that disaggregates the funds awarded by year and agency 
between 2009 and 2011, not just the overall total, would have created a better panel 
data set.  This would also require using data and predictors that match the funds 
awarded year to year such as committee assignment changes and House and Senate 
seat changes from the 2010 midterm elections. 
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Opportunities for Future Research 
There are many opportunities for future research.  One would be to create 
the disaggregated (by year) panel dataset mentioned and use models similar to 
those used here.  
Another avenue for research would be to study state legislatures in relation 
to ARRA.  I only focused on the legislative and executive branch of the Federal 
government. The dynamics between state governors and Federal agencies, state 
government and the president, or internal state determinants of ARRA awards 
would be interesting to investigate. 
Using the number of awards, total funds received, or job creation as 
dependent variables would be another possibility to explore in the future.  
Ultimately, the third goal of the Recovery Act, ‘to foster unprecedented levels of 
accountability and transparency in Recovery spending’ was accomplished and will 
make future research possible because of the amount and detail of the data 
publically disclosed on recovery.gov.  
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Data Sources and Definitions 
 
Total Funds Awarded by Agency: 
 State/Territory Totals by Agency. Recovery.gov. 
http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/RecipientReportedData/Pages/Sta
teTotalsByAgency.aspx. Accessed February 29, 2012.  
 
January 2009 Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate: 
 Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2009, March 11). United States Department of 
Labor.  http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/laus_03112009.pdf  
 
Definitions from bls.gov:  Unemployed persons are those who were not 
employed during the reference week (based on the definition above), had 
actively looked for a job sometime in the 4-week period ending with the 
reference week, and were currently available for work; persons on layoff 
expecting recall need not be looking for work to be counted as unemployed.  
The labor force is the sum of employed and unemployed persons.  The 
unemployment rate is the number of unemployed as a percent of the labor 
force.  Seasonal adjustment.  Seasonal adjustment of modeled estimates of 
employment and unemployment levels is performed within the modeling 
procedure.  Series are decomposed into trend, seasonal, and irregular 
components and survey error.  This directly yields seasonally adjusted 
estimates for employment and unemployment levels with reliability 
measures. Labor force levels and unemployment rates are calculated from 
these two estimates.  
 
Tax revenue growth from 2007 to 2008: 
United States Census Bureau. The 2008 Annual Survey of State Government 
Tax Collections and the 2007 Annual Survey of State Government Tax 
Collections. http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/.  
U.S. Census Bureau definition of taxes: In this survey, "taxes" are defined as 
all compulsory contributions exacted by a government for public purposes, 
except employer and employee assessments for retirement and social 
insurance purposes, which are classified as insurance trust revenue. 
Calculation: A percent change calculation was performed for the growth.:  
 
Real per capita gross domestic product in 2008 and Average GDP growth in the 
states between 2006 to 2008: 
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 Bureau of Labor Statistics Interactive Map. Gross Domestic Product by State 
(GDP by State) Interactive Map. http://www.bea.gov/regional/gdpmap/.  
To compute real GDP by state BLS applies national chain-weighted price 
deflators to current-dollar GDP by state estimates.  Methodologies found at:  
http://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/GDPState/methods.cfm.  
  
Per capita federal aid to state and local governments in 2008: 
The Census Bureau.  Table 1. Federal Government Grants and Other 
Payments to State and Local Governments, by Agency and for Selected 
Programs, by State and Outlying Area: Fiscal Year 2008. 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/fas-08.pdf  
 
Presidential election competitiveness: 
The measure is the number of electoral votes in the state divided by the 
absolute margin between the two major party candidates in the 2008 
election (Obama and McCain).  Statistics provided by the Federal Election 
Commission, Office of Communications, Public Disclosure Division, “2008 
Presidential Electoral and Popular Vote” 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/tables2008.pdf  pp.1-11.  
 
Voted for Obama in 2008:  
This variable assigned a 0 for states that Obama lost in the 2008 presidential 
election and a 1 for states that Obama won.  The information was provided 
by the same source as the presidential election competitiveness measure.  
 
 
 
 
35 
Appendix 
A. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables and Fixed Agencies 
 
Y Coef. Err. T-stat P-value
January 2009 Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate 100.16 71.99 1.39 0.17 -44.51 244.83
Tax revenue growth from 2007 to 2008 76.55 15.23 5.03 0.00 45.95 107.15
Real per capita gross domestic product in 2008 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.89 0.00 0.00
Average GDP growth in the states between 2006 to 2008 94.59 82.71 1.14 0.26 -71.62 260.80
Per capita federal aid to state and local governments in 2008 5.60 2.09 2.68 0.01 1.40 9.79
Average House tenure 0.29 0.25 1.14 0.26 -0.22 0.80
Average Senate tenure -0.04 0.11 -0.39 0.70 -0.25 0.17
Presidential election competitiveness 0.00 0.00 -3.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Voted for Obama in 2008 0.37 2.47 0.15 0.88 -4.59 5.33
Number of Senators on the Full Committee on Appropriations 0.65 2.33 0.28 0.78 -4.04 5.34
Number of Representatives on the Full Committee on Appropriations -2.13 0.64 -3.35 0.00 -3.41 -0.85
Corps of Engineers 4.86 3.71 1.31 0.20 -2.59 12.32
Department of Agriculture 50.98 10.08 5.06 0.00 30.73 71.23
Department of Commerce 12.39 3.90 3.18 0.00 4.56 20.23
Department of Defense (except military departments) -13.18 1.40 -9.44 0.00 -15.98 -10.37
Department of Education 259.25 8.53 30.39 0.00 242.11 276.40
Department of Energy 128.52 15.37 8.36 0.00 97.64 159.40
Department of Health and Human Services 75.32 10.69 7.05 0.00 53.85 96.80
Department of Homeland Security -5.77 2.21 -2.61 0.01 -10.22 -1.32
Department of Housing and Urban Development 21.58 2.68 8.05 0.00 16.19 26.97
Department of Labor -0.48 1.33 -0.36 0.72 -3.16 2.19
Department of State -14.59 1.73 -8.42 0.00 -18.07 -11.10
Department of the Air Force -3.56 3.95 -0.90 0.37 -11.50 4.39
Department of the Army -3.51 3.90 -0.90 0.37 -11.35 4.32
Department of the Interior 7.75 6.07 1.28 0.21 -4.46 19.95
Department of the Navy -11.73 2.13 -5.52 0.00 -16.00 -7.46
Department of the Treasury -9.55 5.64 -1.69 0.10 -20.88 1.78
Department of Transportation 159.53 11.82 13.50 0.00 135.78 183.29
Department of Veterans Affairs -10.21 1.39 -7.34 0.00 -13.01 -7.42
Environmental Protection Agency 18.06 2.62 6.90 0.00 12.80 23.32
Executive Office of the President -16.51 1.38 -11.93 0.00 -19.29 -13.73
Federal Communications Commission -16.31 1.40 -11.62 0.00 -19.13 -13.49
General Services Administration 1.52 3.05 0.50 0.62 -4.61 7.64
Government Accountability Office -16.48 1.38 -11.90 0.00 -19.26 -13.70
National Aeronautics and Space Administration -13.83 1.94 -7.14 0.00 -17.72 -9.93
National Foundation on the Appropriations Arts and the Humanities -16.27 1.37 -11.88 0.00 -19.03 -13.52
National Science Foundation -2.08 4.82 -0.43 0.67 -11.76 7.59
Other Independent Agencies -16.02 1.39 -11.52 0.00 -18.82 -13.23
Small Business Administration -16.14 1.39 -11.59 0.00 -18.94 -13.34
Smithsonian Institution -16.49 1.38 -11.91 0.00 -19.27 -13.71
Social Security Administration -16.33 1.39 -11.75 0.00 -19.13 -13.54
The Legislative Branch -16.48 1.39 -11.90 0.00 -19.26 -13.70
U.S. Agency for International Development -16.40 1.40 -11.70 0.00 -19.21 -13.58
U.S. Tax Court -16.51 1.38 -11.93 0.00 -19.29 -13.73
Constant -4.32 10.11 -0.43 0.67 -24.63 15.99
Coef = coefficient
Err = Robust Standard Error
T-s tat = t-s tatis tic
95% Conf. Int. = 95% Confidence Interva l
95% Conf. Int.
Totall  ARRA Funds Awarded by:
